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ARE NEW PROCEDURES CORRECTION ENOUGH FOR
FLORIDA'S CHILD ABUSE REGISTRY STATUTE?
WALTER E. FoREHANO*
RADLEY MCGEE, aged two, died on July 28, 1989. It was
1 widely reported that he died after being repeatedly dunked in a
toilet by a parent frustrated by the difficulties of potty training the
child. One year later, a Polk County jury convicted a Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services social worker of felony child abuse
and failure to report the suspected child abuse of McGee.' The em-
ployee received a sentence of three years probation. 2
On June 24, 1990, an alligator attacked a Tallahassee child who had
been swimming in a small lake during a Sunday afternoon outing with
his mother. An onlooker, concerned that the mother should have
heeded warnings of an alligator in the lake, reported the mother to the
child abuse registry.3 A newspaper account indicated that the woman
who claimed to have made the report was accompanied at the lake by
an abuse registry counselor. 4 In a follow-up story, the mother was
quoted as complaining that the incident had been printed without suf-
ficient investigation on the part of the newspaper. That story noted:
[The Tallahassee Democrat Managing Editor] said it would have
been preferable to run Tuesday's story with [the mother's] version,
had it been available. But he defended publishing the story without
it.
"When the incident became the subject of a formal complaint to
the Abuse Registry we felt we had to run the story," [the editor]
said. "We regret that our considerable effort to talk to [the mother]
was unsuccessful. ' 5
* B.S., 1963; M.S., 1964, University of Florida; Ph.D., 1968, University of Texas at Aus-
tin; J.D., 1988, Florida State University College of Law.
1. Tallahassee Democrat, June 16, 1990, at IA, col. 3; see FLA. STAT. § 415.513(1)
(1989)(failure by certain persons to report suspected child abuse is a second degree misde-
meanor).
2. Tallahassee Democrat, July 7, 1990, at IA, col. 6.
3. FiA. STAT. §§ 415.502-.514 (1989). The mechanics of the system are the focus of this
article and are discussed beginning with section I, infra. The enabling statute is administered by
the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter "the Department").
4. Tallahassee Democrat, June 26, 1990, at IC, col. 3.
5. Id., June 27, 1990, at IB, col. 4.
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These two incidents are hardly the only ones concerning child abuse
and the child abuse registry, both of which have been prominent top-
ics in the media during the last several years. The stories are illustra-
tive, nonetheless, of the increased exposure of and pressure on
Florida's child abuse registry statute. 6
The McGee case may prove influential in causing more reports from
those statutorily required to report child abuse 7 and in causing child
protective investigators who are on the front line of abuse investiga-
tions to err on the side of more reporting in an effort to avoid crimi-
nal liability. The Tallahassee incident illustrates the problem with
preserving a truly confidential system. If the quotation from the edi-
tor is any indication, a hint of registry involvement may be enough to
precipitate the publishing of a story that might otherwise have been
delayed or never published.
Florida's child abuse registry statute represents an effort to balance
the legitimate interests of parents, the need for protection of children,
and the efficient operation of a state intervention program. In 1990,
the legislature tinkered with the statute and readjusted this balance.
The 1990 amendments" must be examined in the light of existing judi-
cial interpretations and judicial challenges to the pre-amendment
statute9 and with a view toward analyzing significant changes and re-
maining problems in the legislation. Although the 1990 legislature
stopped far short of reconstructing the statutory scheme, significant
changes in definitions and procedure, especially as related to due
process, could have a profound effect on the future of the operation
of the registry system.
I. THE CHILD ABUSE REGISTRY STATUTE IN PERSPECTIVE
Before examining the effects of the 1990 amendments in detail, it
will be useful to present an overview of Florida's child abuse registry
statute both in terms of its provisions and in terms of its practical
administration. Because the 1990 amendments did not alter the basic
legislative scheme, this introductory overview concerns itself only with
providing orientation for the detailed work to follow.
The legislature created the abuse registry system "in an effort to
prevent further harm to the child or any other children living in the
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 415.502-.514 (1989).
7. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 415.504(l) (1989).
8. Ch. 90-50, §§ 5-10, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 72-82 (West)(to be codified at FLA.
STAT. §§ 415.503, .504, .505, .51).
9. See Complaint for Damages, Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Judgment, N.L. v.
Coler, No. 90-40069 MP (N.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 1990) (seeking among other relief to have sections
of the statute declared unconstitutional on due process grounds).
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home and to preserve the family life of the parents and children, to
the maximum extent possible, by enhancing the parental capacity for
adequate child care."' 0 In concept, then, the reporting system is in-
tended to identify children who have been harmed in the home and to
prevent further harm. Although the statement of purpose emphasizes
issues connected with the family, the statutory scheme goes beyond
the home and into the day care center and the school setting. Further-
more, while there are legislatively mandated procedures and methods
which attempt to address the goal of preserving family unity, investi-
gation of reports may also lead to dependency proceedings under
Chapter 39 or criminal prosecutions." Analysis of the statute, both
before and after the 1990 session, will reveal whether the legislature
has constructed a scheme that will accomplish its commendable pur-
pose in an effective and constitutionally permissible manner.
A registry of reported and classified cases of child abuse or sus-
pected child abuse 2 and a procedure for investigation of. those
reports 3 comprise the basic structure of the system. The list of per-
sons required to report suspected child abuse includes most medical
personnel or hospital personnel engaged in admissions and treatment;
other health or mental health professionals; 14 spiritual healers; school
teachers, officials, and personnel; social workers, day care workers,
and other professionals involved in child care or child care institu-
tions; and law enforcement officers." The report is made to a "central
abuse registry and tracking system" on a "statewide toll-free tele-
phone number.' ' 6 The reports of persons in the occupations listed
must be confirmed in writing within forty-eight hours of call-in.' 7 The
legislature intended, however, that reports also be made by persons
not in the listed occupations. 18
This reporting requirement is the teeth of the statute, and it is
strengthened by making the failure to report abuse by persons re-
10. FLA. STAT. § 415.502 (1989).
11. Cf. id. §§ 39.40-.418 (dependency proceedings); id. §§ 39.46-.474 (termination of paren-
tal rights); id. §§ 827.01-.08 (criminal child abuse).
12. Id. § 415.504.
13. Id. § 415.505.
14. But cf. State v. Groff, 409 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)(psychiatrist with reason to
believe that a patient is abusing the patient's daughter not statutorily obligated to notify HRS).
Although this case deals with reporting requirements imposed by section 827.07(4), Florida Sta-
tutes (1975), the statutes are quite similar in concept. Groff, however, turned on an interpreta-
tion of the phrase "serving children," which does not appear in section 415.504(1), Florida
Statutes (1989).
15. FLA. STAT. § 415.504(1) (1989).
16. Id. § 415.504(2)(a).
17. Id. § 415.504(2)(b).
18. Id. § 415.504(4)(a)("any person" can make a report).
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quired to make such a report, or the prevention of another from re-
porting, a second degree misdemeanor.1 9 As a result, those who work
closely with children and those who administer their health care have
a strong incentive to spot physical abuse or neglect. In placing the
burden on such persons, the statute provides a mechanism for moni-
toring serious abuse or neglect, and for identifying signs of undetected
or potential harm. However, the stringent reporting requirement also
encourages intervention in the area of parental discipline, where inves-
tigation of an unfounded report can lead to great disruption for the
individual and for the family.
Persons not required to report abuse do not have to identify them-
selves when making a report. 2° The absence of such a requirement in-
creases the possibility of anonymous calls from estranged spouses, ex-
spouses, or from disgruntled or interfering neighbors. The possibility
of such informers, although certainly not forbidden by the confronta-
tion clause, is repugnant.2 1 Distaste must, of course, be weighed
against the desire to protect children. The statute is throughout a con-
scious balance of interests and of burdens and benefits.
Child protective investigators conduct the inquiry into incidents of
alleged child abuse. 22 After investigation, the Department classifies the
report and gives the results to the alleged perpetrator. 23 Before the
1990 amendments, the Department used the classifications of "un-
founded," "indicated," and "confirmed," depending upon whether
there was sufficient evidence to conclude that there had been child
abuse and whether a perpetrator could be identified.24
The Department places a confirmed perpetrator's name in the abuse
registry for fifty years.25 This disqualifies the perpetrator from holding
certain jobs, especially those related to children, the aged, and the dis-
abled, either as a state employee or under state contract.2 6 The statute
does provide procedures for obtaining a waiver of disqualification,
which could help avoid the emotional and other burdensome effects
of a confirmed report. 27
19. Id. § 415.513(1).
20. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145.3 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (anonymous reports al-
lowed though recorder shall attempt to obtain name) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 11167(a) (West
1982 & Supp. 1990) (report shall include name of reporter).
21. The confrontation clause gives defendants in criminal prosecutions the right to face
their accusers and the right to effective cross-examination of witness called against them. See,
e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
22. FLA. STAT. § 415.504(4)(b) (1989).
23. Id. § 415.504(4)(c).
24. See id.
25. Id. §415.504(4)(c).
26. See id. §§ 415.504(4)(d)3.6, 415.51(4)-(6).
27. Id. §415.504(4)(d)(5).
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The Department has developed an extensive manual to guide in the
investigation of reports and the classification of reports upon comple-
tion of the investigation. 28 While supervisors monitor the process
throughout, individual investigators seek out facts and make the clas-
sification. The Department does not require extensive training for
these individuals, and they can vary greatly in level of experience. 29
Under the law before the 1990 amendments, when a report was clas-
sified as confirmed and a perpetrator was named, the Department al-
lowed the individual an opportunity to apply for internal
departmental review of the decision.30 There was, however, no statu-
tory right to be present at this review, and neither the rules nor the
statute prohibited the supervisor who worked on the case from sitting
on the reviewing committee. If the classification remained unchanged,
the perpetrator had the right to request an administrative hearing un-
der the provisions of Chapter 120. 31
To implement fully the legislative purpose of "preserv[ing] the fam-
ily life of the parents and children," 32 the statute created child protec-
tion teams in addition to child protective investigators. These teams
provide medical and psychological support services in situations which
may portend serious family problems and significant threat of future
harm to the child.33 Other sections addressed taking a child into pro-
tective custody 4 and the appointing of guardians ad litem for judicial
proceedings and guardian advocates as a protection separate from de-
pendency.5
The statute also addresses specialized legal issues arising out of the
abuse registry system. Persons acting in good faith in performing acts
authorized or required by the statute are immune from criminal or
civil liability.36 The statute protects certain employees from reprisal or
discharge and creates a private cause of action for compensatory and
punitive damages to redress work place reprisal against the person re-
porting. 37
28. FLORIDA DEP'T OF HRS, PAMPHLET No. 175-1, CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES INVESTIGA-
TION DECISIONS HANDBOOK (1988)[hereinafter HANDBOOK].
29. Neither the statute nor the Handbook, supra note 28, mandate any minimal level of
training.
30. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(d)(5) (1989).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 415.502.
33. See id. § 415.5055.
34. Id. § 415.506.
35. See id. §§ 415.508, .509.
36. Id. § 415.511(l)(a).
37. Id. § 415.511(2).
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Anticipating that privileges created by the evidentiary code could
inhibit reporting, investigation, and proceedings contemplated by the
statute, the statute removes all but the attorney/client privilege. 3 The
other privileges, including the marital and mental health professional/
client privileges, have been abolished with respect to both reporting
requirements and giving evidence in judicial proceedings related to
child abuse. 39
In addition to the potential criminal liability for the failure of cer-
tain persons to report alleged abuse, the 1989 statute makes knowing,
willful disclosure of confidential information a second degree misde-
meanor. 4° The act also provides that making a false report or advising
another to do so is a second degree misdemeanor. The false report
must be made knowingly and willfully; reporters acting in good faith
are exempted. 4' While the "false reporting" statute might provide
some protection against malicious reporting, as long as the system re-
quires investigation of anonymous reports, the protection is minimal.
One envisions prosecution only of those who have bragged openly of
harassing others with false reports.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE 1990 AMENDMENTS
A. The Definition of Child Abuse or Neglect
Central to the workings of the registry are the questions of which
persons and what acts are subject to its regulation. The 1989 statute
defined child abuse or neglect as "harm or threatened harm to a
child's physical or mental health or welfare by the acts or omissions of
the parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare. ''42 In
keeping with the purpose of the statute, this definition is broader than
similar definitions in statutes concerning dependency, termination of
parental rights, and criminal child abuse.43 A full understanding of the
definition requires analysis of the terms "harm" and of "other person
responsible for the child's welfare. '""
38. Id. § 415.512.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 415.513(2).
41. Id. § 415.513(3).
42. Id. § 415.503(3).
43. Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes, defines abuse as a "willful act" causing or likely to
cause significant mental or emotional impairment. Sections 827.03 and 827.04, Florida Statutes,
define child abuse and aggravated child abuse in terms of actual effects of willful acts, knowing
or culpable negligence, or malice, and make gradations of severity of offense based in part on
the severity of harm.
44. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(3) (1989).
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1. Definition of "Harm"
The extensive statutory definition of harm included injury resulting
from excessive corporal punishment; drug dependency of newborns;
sexual abuse; exploitation; abandonment; failure to supervise prop-
erly; and failure to provide proper food, clothing, shelter, and health
care. 45 The 1990 amendments added "exposure to drugs which causes
physical, mental, or developmental problems." 4 Undoubtedly, the
most difficult definition to interpret has been "[ilnjury sustained as a
result of excessive corporal punishment." 47 The statute refines that
definition by defining "physical injury" as "death, permanent or
temporary disfigurement, or impairment of any bodily part. '" 48
The practical problem with these definitions of harm and physical
injury, which a fortiori significantly affect the definition of child
abuse or neglect, has been the treatment of corporal punishment ad-
ministered as discipline. Other states have addressed the problem di-
rectly. Missouri, for example, in its definition of abuse, provides that
"discipline including spanking, administered in a reasonable manner
shall not be construed to be abuse." 49 South Carolina is even more
explicit, excluding "corporal punishment" or "physical discipline"
from the definition of "excessive corporal punishment" if adminis-
tered (1) by a parent or person in loco parentis; (2) to restrain or cor-
rect; (3) in a reasonable manner and with moderate force; (4) without
causing lasting damage; and (5) without reckless or grossly negligent
behavior.5 0 In Florida, the question of when a spanking, whether by a
parent or a school official, constitutes abuse has been the subject of
administrative and judicial decision. A few examples will serve to give
an idea of the parameters established for defining physical abuse in
this area and of the problems this definition presents.
Since permanent or temporary disfigurement5' may constitute physi-
cal injury, which in turn will constitute harm when corporal punish-
ment has been applied, and since spankings may leave bruises, the
question has arisen as to whether a bruise is per se evidence of child
abuse.
45. Id. § 415.503(9).
46. Ch. 90-50, § 5, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 73-74 (West)(to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 415.503(9)).
47. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(a)(1) (1989).
48. Id. § 415.503(14).
49. Mo. REv .STAT. §210.110(l) (Vernon 1983 &Supp. 1990).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(C)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
51. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(14) (1989).
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Two district courts of appeal have considered the issue of the evi-
dentiary value of a bruise and the length of time it lasts.52 The Depart-
ment had developed an internal policy that "required investigators to
confirm reports of excessive corporal punishment in all cases where
bruises remained visible at least twenty-four hours later ... -"3 In
fact, some investigators have apparently used a one hour rule rather
than a twenty-four hour rule. 4 The issues posed by application of the
twenty-four hour rule are (1) whether such evidence can be conclusive,
and (2) whether there can be confirmed child abuse if bruising is the
only evidence of harm from corporal punishment.
Both District Court of Appeal cases involved spankings adminis-
tered as discipline by school personnel. In B.L., the hearing officer
had found that the spanking of two students, otherwise properly ad-
ministered, had left bruises lasting approximately one week." The De-
partment ruled that the accused party had used excessive force when
punishment inflicted bruises lasting six to seven days.56 A divided
court upheld the Department's order, but in dicta noted that due
process prohibited the application of a "six- or seven-day 'bruising
rule' to establish a conclusive presumption." The court affirmed,
however, ruling in part that bruising lasting six or seven days could be
accepted as evidence of excessive corporal punishment, and in this
case was sufficient evidence to sustain a confirmed classification.58
Judge Thompson delivered a sharp dissent. He noted that the stat-
ute granted authority for the use of corporal punishment in schools
and prevented local school boards from prohibiting the use of corpo-
ral punishment.59 He found significant that the punishment "was ap-
plied with an appropriate instrument and it was applied in the usual
manner. There was no evidence that the punishment was given in an-
ger or with ill will, malice, or intent to injure." 60
According to Judge Thompson, the record revealed that the Depart-
ment had used the six- or seven-day rule to create an irrebuttable pre-
52. B.L. v. Department of HRS, 545 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), review denied, 553
So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1989); B.R. v. Department of HRS, 558 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); see
also J.C. v. Department of HRS, 561 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); D.J. v. Department of
HRS, 15 Fla. L.W. D2052 (2d DCA Aug. 10, 1990)(reaffirming B.R.).
53. B.R., 558 So. 2d at 1028.
54. See B.L., 545 So. 2d at 291 (implying that agency official employed one-hour rule).
55. Id. at 290.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 291-92.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 293(Thompson, J., dissenting)(citing FLA. STAT. §§ 230.23(6)(c) (1989)).
60. Id.
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sumption. 6' Given the "[viarying degrees of susceptibility to bruising
[that] exist" among children, 62 he argued that basing a finding of ex-
cessive force solely upon application of this rule anmounted to an arbi-
trary and capricious deprivation of the appellant's rights. 63 This is
particularly true, he noted, in cases where the only evidence comes
from the parents, who report the alleged abuse eight days after it hap-
pened, and claim that the bruise lasted for seven days. 64 In such a
case, apparently "[n]o amount of competent substantial evidence can
overcome the irrebuttable presumption of excessive force that the par-
ents' testimony creates." 65
Beyond his objection to the use of a presumption, Judge Thompson
did not fully explain his opinion on the evidentiary significance of the
length of time a bruise remains visible. A complete understanding of
his dissent became crucial when the Second District adopted the dis-
sent as its opinion. In December of 1989, the Second District decided
the case of B.R., 66 which also involved spanking a student. Two
school employees had each given a child two swats with a paddle. The
hearing officer did not find evidence of excessive punishment other
than bruising, but indicated that he felt bound by the twenty-four
hour rule. 67 A unanimous court found the conclusive presumption of
the twenty-four hour rule impermissible.68 The court adopted the
Thompson dissent in B.L. as its opinion, and "acknowledge[d] appar-
ent conflict with" the First District's opinion in B.L. 69
According to the B.L. majority, the hearing officers below did not
use a conclusive presumption. The court stated that "the hearing offi-
cers' conclusions are obviously based solely on the evidence pre-
sented."'70 Judge Thompson believed, however, that the hearing
officers had applied an arbitrary and capricious presumption. Both
sides agreed that such a presumption would be unconstitutional; the
dispute was over whether one had actually been used. The B.L. ma-
jority stated that establishment of a conclusive presumption solely on
the basis of a six- or seven-day rule would "amount[] to a denial of
due process." 71
61. Id. at 292.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 293.
65. Id.
66. 558 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
67. Id. at 1028.
68. Id. at 1029.
69. Id. at 1029.
70. 545 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
71. Id. at 292 (citing Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987)(footnote
omitted)).
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The Second District's interpretation of both B.L. opinions clouds
the issue. That court believes it is in conflict with the proposition that
certain evidence of bruising is relevant and admissible. It held that "as
a matter of law. . . there is no rational connection between the length
of time a bruise remains visible and the ultimate fact of excessive cor-
poral punishment." ' 72 The apparent conflict it acknowledged, com-
bined with the holding in B.R., indicate that, in the Second District,
evidence of length of time is not admissible to prove excessive force.
On the other hand, the Second District stated that "[w]hether cor-
poral punishment is excessive must be proved in each case by compe-
tent, substantial evidence, and all relevant issues presented must be
considered without resort to arbitrary presumptions fixed by the pas-
sage of time." '7 This statement suggests that the Second District ob-
jected only to the use of a conclusive presumption based on length of
time, but would still admit evidence of bruising itself. This position is
eminently more reasonable than excluding the evidence altogether, in
that whatever weaknesses exist in the evidentiary value of the length
of time that a bruise remains visible should go to the weight, rather
than the admissibility, of the evidence.
After the decision in B.L., the Department formally amended its
position, receding from a per se test.74 Instead, the Department re-
turned to criteria presented in an earlier case.7 There, the Department
had declared that the factors to be considered in establishing excessive
corporal punishment were
(a) the nature and severity of the injury;
(b) the location of the injury;
(c) whether the perpetrator's action resulted in other injury to the
child;
(d) the age of the child;
(e) the manner in which the injury was inflicted;
(e) the appropriateness of the discipline to the seriousness of the
offense. 76
Comparison with the Missouri and South Carolina statutes indi-
cates that other legislatures have addressed corporal punishment di-
rectly. 77 The fact that Florida has not suggests strongly that there has
72. 558 So. 2d at 1029 (emphasis added).
73. Id.
74. See Department of HRS v. Z.S., I I Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4756, 4757 (1989).
75. Id. at 4759-60.
76. Department of HRS v. S.K.H, 9 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 6509, 6511 (1987).
77. Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.110(1) (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
490(C)(1) (Law Co-op 1988).
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been no attempt to establish a separate standard for corrective punish-
ment. On the other hand, the judicial glosses on the statute that have
just been discussed indicate that courts are reluctant to find that rou-
tine spanking, which may leave some bruising, is child abuse, despite
the philosophical opposition of some people to all corporal punish-
ment of children.
The present state of the law appears to be that the fact of bruising
and the severity thereof may be one of a number of factors which can
lead to the classification of an event as confirmed child abuse. The
two district courts to have examined the issue so far disagree over the
evidentiary significance of the length of time that a bruise has lasted.
Moreover, when the fact-finding of a formal administrative hearing
has been presented to the Department, it is free to apply the law inde-
pendent of the hearing officer's recommendation to the facts that
have been found.78 The Department is a state-wide agency, and ad-
ministrative hearings on abuse registry classifications are held
throughout the state. Consequently, conflict between the districts
leaves uncertain whether a spanking in Tampa will be considered un-
der the same standard as one in Tallahassee. Nor does one know what
the Third, Fourth, or Fifth Districts might decide. As the agency
charged with interpreting this statute, the Department remains some-
what vague as to the route it will take to reconcile these conflicts, and
apparent unevenness exists, as the following cases will demonstrate.
In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. R.C.M. , 79 a
father disciplined his son by spanking him with three blows of a belt,
causing a welt. The welt disappeared in a few hours, but a small
bruise remained. s° The mother was fearful that someone might see the
bruise and kept the child home from school. 8' When the child returned
to school, he told his classmates of the incident.8 2 The child later
showed an investigator other bruises, which the evidence revealed
were caused by incidents unrelated to parental discipline, and the in-
vestigator concluded that the report should be confirmed. 83 The hear-
ing officer recommended that the report be expunged completely.84
The Department found that the confirmed classification should be al-
78. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(10) (1989).
79. 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 6033 (1989).
80. Id. at 6037.
81. Id. at 6037-38.
82. Id. at 6038.
83. Id. at 6038-39. The hearing officer indicated that the child had a history of exaggerating
about the frequency and severity of the discipline he received, in an apparent effort to impress
his classmates. Id. at 6036.
84. Id. at 6041.
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tered, but that the fact there was an attempt to avoid investigation
supported a classification of "indicated." 85
In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. M.A. ,86 the
Department refused to accept a hearing officer's recommendation that
a report be expunged, ordering that it should remain confirmed. 7 In
effect, while there were a "bruise and welt marks" on the child, the
hearing officer concluded as a matter of law that under the circum-
stances this did not constitute child abuse. 88 The Department chose to
apply the facts differently, relying in part on B.L. for the proposition
that "[biruises constitute temporary disfigurement,' '89 and noting that
the statute makes no allowances for different ethnic practices in disci-
pline (the family was of Arabic origin)20
The M.A. case illustrates a practical problem created by the use of
the administrative process as a forum for fact-finding and application
of law. M.A. and A.A., the parents, appeared pro se.91 They carried
their effort to change the classification to the independent hearing of-
ficer, and the agency, exercising its power to interpret the law, 92 effec-
tively left the parents where they had begun before the hearing. Only
resort to judicial review, a radical step for ordinary persons not
threatened with actual loss of employment by the ruling, allows a re-
view completely independent of potential agency bias. Consequently,
it is difficult to test the agency's interpretation of legal issues suffi-
ciently by appeal to the judiciary in order to establish clear parameters
for these definitions.
The lack of uniformity among the Department's decisions is illus-
trated in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. K.M.93
There, the hearing officer concluded that:
In the instant case, the evidence of record shows only that a
concerned mother spanked her daughter for misconduct which she
felt merited swift and convincing punishment. The minor temporary
blemish on T.'s body, seen by the counselor, and relied upon by [the
85. Id. at 6033. An indicated finding has the effect of keeping a record on the registry for
seven years without identifying a perpetrator, and without the disqualification resulting from a
confirmed classification. FLA. STAT. §§ 415.504(4)(c), .504(4)(d)(3)(b) (1989).
86. 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 187, 188 (1990).
87. Id. at 189.
88. Id. at 193.
89. Id. at 189.
90. Id. The hearing officer indicated that spanking is a regular form of discipline in Arabic
homes.
91. Id. at 190.
92. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(d) (1990).
93. 11 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 6026 (1989).
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investigator] to support his classification of "confirmed" does not
serve to fulfill the agency's burden to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the punishment imposed by Respondent was
''excessive. 94
Despite the presence of a bruise, the Department adopted this recom-
mendation. 95
Finally, the case of Department of Health and Rehabilitative Serv-
ices v. J. W.96 demonstrates how the decision as to whether spanking is
excessive can vary greatly with the decision-maker. A father spanked
his two-year-old in connection with a plan of discipline to keep the
child from continually getting out of bed at bedtime. He had never
spanked the child before the incident, had not spanked him after the
incident, and was following a plan that the parents had agreed upon.
The spanking left rather considerable bruises, but caused no signifi-
cant impairment. 97 The hearing officer acknowledged that "all evi-
dence which would tend to afford insight into this event must be
examined without regard for any presumption based upon the dura-
tion of the injury in terms of its physical manifestation," citing both
B.L. and B.R. 9 Still, he recommended, and the Department agreed, 99
that the report remain confirmed because:
[w]hen taking into account the nature and severity of the bruises,
especially considering the child's age, J.W.'s use of corporal
punishment on this occasion is seen to be excessive. This is an
unfortunate outcome given that everyone who remarked about this
case pointed out the fine relationship between the father and his
child, but the law under which this case is examined looks upon that
relationship in a more discrete fashion incident by incident, not
allowing the overall quality of that bond to dictate the outcome.) °
The J. W. decision brings the problem in defining excessive corporal
punishment into sharp focus. If the Legislature intends to discourage
all corporal punishment, which it might wish to do, the statutes
should clearly embody that goal. As it stands, the individual investiga-
tor, the individual hearing officer, and above all the Department
through its review of recommended orders, must struggle with their
94. Id. at 6032.
95. Id. at 6026a.
96. No. 90-0336C (Div. of Admin. Hearings Apr. 5, 1990).
97. Id. at 2-3.
98. Id. at 10.
99. Department of HRS v. J.W., No. 90-0336C (June 5, 1990).
100. No. 90-0336C (Div. of Admin. Hearings Apr. 5, 1990).
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own prejudices and what each perceives public policy to be. In J. W.,
all evidence pointed to a mistake in assessing the effect of a spanking
by a father who had never spanked the child before. The evidence did
not suggest that the mistake had impaired the child, or that it por-
tended the "tip of the iceberg" of a growing problem. There was no
attempt to hide the facts.'0' Still, the Hearing Officer interpreted the
law as unremitting and requiring a confirmed finding. Later analysis
will discuss this problem in the context of due process. 0 2
2. Definition of "Other Person Responsible for the Child's
Welfare"
The statute defines "other person responsible for a child's welfare"
as legal guardians or custodians, foster parents, employees of public
and private schools or day care centers, and employees or legally re-
sponsible persons of homes and facilities. 03 The 1990 amendments did
not alter this definition.
The Florida "other person" language emphasizes legal responsibil-
ity (guardians, directors of facilities) and in loco parentis relationships
(school employees, foster parents, caretakers). Thus, if abuse happens
at the hands of one other than a parent or "other person," it is not
child abuse for the purpose of the child abuse registry statute. This
omission undermines the purpose of the statute.
In D.A.0. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative SerVices,' °4
for example, an uncle who had had sex with his niece for a six-year
period (beginning when the uncle was thirteen and the niece five) did
not commit child abuse for the purpose of the registry under circum-
stances where he lived with the mutual grandmother, but the child did
not, although she visited the house frequently. 05 Also excluded was a
man who performed oral sex on a fifteen-year-old boy because the
man had no relationship with the child as defined by the statute.' °6
3. Amendments to the Definition of "Child Abuse"
The legislature made two changes which increased the number of
those affected by the section. In addition to parents, an "adult house-
hold member" is now among those who can commit child abuse for
101. Id. at 4-5 (child delivered the next morning to nursery school and father admitted using
corporal punishment).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 157-66.
103. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(13) (1989).
104. 561 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
105. Id. at 381-82.
106. P.N. v. Department of HRS, 562 So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
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the purposes of the child abuse registry. '0 Furthermore, the legislature
has added the language "or, for purposes of reporting requirements,
by any person."'08
While it may be argued that these additions do not go far enough, it
is clear that the legislature has struggled with the question of whom
Florida wishes to monitor with its abuse registry statute. Jurisdictions
by no means agree in this respect. California, for example, defines
child abuse, at least as it relates to physical injury and not neglect, as
"physical injury which is inflicted by other than accidental means on
a child by another person."'' 0 9 Missouri's scheme encompasses
"[tihose responsible for the care, custody, and control of the
child,"" 0 including "but not limited to the parents or guardian of a
child, other members of the child's household, or those exercising su-
pervision over a child for any part of a twenty-four hour day.""'
Florida's other abuse registry, which protects aged or disabled
adults, defines abuse as "infliction of physical or psychological injury
• .. or the failure of a caregiver to take reasonable measures to pre-
vent [such injury] .11 l 2 The 1990 Legislature has changed that language
to make explicit that nonaccidental injury (as opposed to preventable
accidental injury) inflicted "by a relative, caregiver, or adult house-
hold member" will now constitute abuse for the purpose of that regis-
try. ' Whereas the previous statute emphasized institutional care as
the setting for abuse, the 1990 amendments enlarged the scope of cul-
pability to include relatives and to encompass the household setting
(while narrowing the scope of actionable injuries to accidents).
As analogous activity with respect to the adult abuse registry sug-
gests, these additions to the definition of child abuse must be consid-
ered a careful attempt to define more precisely the scope of child
abuse for the purposes of the child abuse registry. The addition of
"adult household member" should enlarge the scope significantly. It
would not, presumably, have affected the case of D.A.O.,11 4 where
107. Ch. 90-50, § 5, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 74 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.503(1)).
108. Ch. 90-50, § 5 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 415.503(1)). The full definition of child
abuse is "harm or threatened harm to a child's physical or mental welfare by the acts or omis-
sions of a parent, adult household member, or other person responsible for the child's welfare,
or, for the purposes of reporting requirements, by any person." Id.
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.6 (West 1976 & Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
110. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.110(6) (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1990).
111. Id.
112. FLA. STAT. § 415.102(1) (1989).
113. Ch. 90-50, § 1, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 65 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.102(1)).
114. 561 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
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the child was not a member of the uncle's household. Nor would it
affect a situation such as that presented in P.N.,"11 where the abuser
was a person "unconnected" to the child. Apparently, Florida contin-
ues to make a conscious choice to exclude such interactions, unlike
California, whose statute extends to "any person."'"1 6 Still, sexual
abuse by adult siblings or step-parents, aunts, uncles, and roommates
of parents will now be included. Moreover, physical abuse by house-
hold members other than parents is now subject to a report.
The new language broadening reporting requirements to include all
perpetrators" 7 could have a significant effect. The amendment sug-
gests that the legislature has decided that all suspected child abuse
should be reported so that it can be decided after investigation how to
react and whether the abuse is covered by the abuse registry scheme.
The legislature has created potential conflict between these amend-
ments and other subsections of the definitions section. While courts
may well give little consideration to these theoretical conflicts, recent
decisions have suggested that, at least with respect to spanking, there
is some judicial impatience with the way in which the statute is being
administered." 8 Specifically, the legislature failed to include "adult
household member" and the "purposes of reporting" phrase to the
definition of child abuse in other sections upon which it depends or in
which it is implemented. Thus, although the statute still defines an
"abused or neglected child" as one harmed or threatened with harm
by "the parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare,"
the same subsection now requires reporting of abuse committed "by
any person."" 9 It would be difficult to find or report child abuse or
neglect in a situation where, by definition, there was no abused or
neglected child. The mandatory reports of section 415.504(1) are re-
quired when the person "knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect,
that a child is an abused or neglected child" (emphasis added). If the
definitions are strictly applied, the reporters might observe child
abuse, but because of the identity of the abuser, not be required to
report because of the unamended definition of abused child. Any
criminal sanctions for failure to report in such a case could be avoided
by courts invoking requirements for strict construction of criminal
statutes. Similarly, the definitions of harm and of "other person re-
115. 562 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
116. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11167(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
117. Ch. 90-50 § 5, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 72 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.503(1)).
118. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 52-73.
119. Ch. 90-50, § 5, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 72 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.503(1)).
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sponsible" have remained unchanged. Child abuse requires harm, but
harm can be attributed only to parents or "other persons responsi-
ble. '120
Such inconsistencies will likely become more significant where crim-
inal liability is at issue. By failing to integrate the amendments
throughout the existing statute, the legislature might have compro-
mised the state's efforts to fight the very real problem of child abuse
in our society.
B. New Procedures for Initiating the Investigation
Amendments to the section that establishes the mechanics of the
registry reveal some of the concerns that in the past have attended
investigations. Formerly, upon receipt of a report, the agency made
an immediate check of prior reports, then conducted triage to deter-
mine whether a report merited immediate onsite investigation. Under
any circumstances, investigation began within twenty-four hours.' 2'
The amended statute now requires, in addition, that investigators at
the onset disclose to the subject of the investigation:
a. The names of the investigators and identifying credentials from
the department.
b. The purpose of the investigation.
c. The possible consequences of the investigation.
d. How the information provided by the subject may be used.
e. The description of the risk assessment process and placement of a
child.
f. That the child, the child's parent or guardian, a perpetrator named
in a proposed confirmed report, and legal counsel for the
aforementioned persons have a right to a copy of the report at the
conclusion of the investigation.
g. That persons who are entitled to receive a copy of the report also
have the right to submit a written comment or rebuttal which may be
made a part of the report.
h. That subjects may have additional appeal rights which will be
explained in writing when appropriate and necessary at the
conclusion of the investigation.
i. That the court will appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
interest of the child should dependency proceedings result from the
investigation.
120. Id.
121. FLA. STAT. § 415.504(4)(b) (1989).
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j. The telephone number and name of a department employee
available to answer questions.2
The import of these changes can be seen from a review of the regis-
try process. Investigations begin with a report to the registry. An in-
vestigator is dispatched to the site to conduct interviews.1 23 Upon
completion of the investigation, under the statute as it existed before
October 1, 1990, the Department would classify the report as "con-
firmed," "indicated," or "unfounded."' 24 The agency kept un-
founded reports in the registry for one year, indicated reports for
seven years, and confirmed reports for fifty years. 125 Unfounded re-
ports were indexed by the child's name only; no one in unfounded or
indicated reports was identified as a perpetrator. Confirmed reports
did indicate a perpetrator, and confirmed abusers faced a disqualifica-
tion from a number of jobs.126
The Department notified the subject of the potential sanctions only
after classification of the report. 27 That notice would also inform
confirmed abusers of their right to request that the Department review
the report with an eye towards amendment or expunction.128 There
was no redress for those accused in indicated or unfounded reports. 29
The accused could request a Chapter 120 hearing upon the Depart-
ment's refusal to amend, or, if the Department refused to act, after
thirty days. 30
Thus, under the pre-amendment statute, the subject of an abuse in-
vestigation might have little or no idea what the consequences of the
investigation might be until the report was classified. 3' In fact, there
is a certain incentive for an investigator not to reveal too much to the
122. Ch. 90-50, § 6, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 75 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.504(4)(c)(1)).
123. FLA. STAT. § 415.504(b) (1989).
124. Id. § 415.504(4)(c).
125. Id.
126. See id. § 415.51(4) (1989).
127. Id. § 415.504(d)(1).
128. Id. § 415.504(d)(2) (1989).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 415.504(5).
131. See id. §§ 415.505(2)(a)(b), .506. It is clear that the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), are not required in this investigation, absent custody or other
coercive circumstances. See State v. Brydon, 626 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); cf. Baltimore
City Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990) (no fifth amendment right to bring
child into court in protection proceedings context); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341
(1976) (Miranda warnings not required for non-custodial interrogations performed by IRS inves-
tigators). Missouri was the innovator in requiring substantial warnings to subjects at the initial
stage of investigation. See Comment, Changes in the Missouri Laws of Child Abuse: Changes
for the Better?, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 549 (1987).
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subject. Often the simplest way to develop evidence necessary to prove
abuse is by admission of the perpetrator. For example, if a school
reports that a child has received a serious injury to his or her face
from an unexplained cause, and if the child is reluctant to talk with
the investigator for fear of additional punishment, there may be no
competent substantial evidence to support a confirmed classification,
the liberal hearsay rule of administrative proceedings notwithstand-
ing. 132
These amendments illustrate the constant tension found in the legis-
lative scheme. The abusive parent who might otherwise have re-
sponded to the investigator's question, "Do you know how Johnny's
face was hurt?", with "I knocked the smart alec for sassing me; I do
it all the time!" may now think twice, and the result could be less
protection for the child. Conversely, parents formerly willing to coop-
erate with an overly zealous investigator, and who thereby ran some
risk of having their child taken into protective custody to prevent
problems perceived by the investigator but not by the parents, may
now understand the possible consequences of the investigation and be
able to protect their rights as parents better. The Department needs to
remember that it administers the statute for the protection of children,
not to establish how children should be raised. 3 1
C. New Procedures for Classification and Review
In addition to the new language mandating initial "warnings" by
protective investigators, the revised section 415.504 makes a signifi-
cant change in the classification system. Under the 1989 statute, re-
ports were classified as "unfounded," "indicated," or "confirmed."
This classification took place at the investigative level; therefore, the
first opportunity for direct input from the subject of the investigation
into the decision-making process came after classification had been
made, when, in the case of confirmed reports, the perpetrator was
given the opportunity to request review of the decision by the Depart-
ment. Thus, a confirmed report, classified without an opportunity to
be heard, could be entered into the system, and remain there through-
out the process of internal departmental review, administrative hear-
ing, and judicial review, only to be changed at some later stage in the
process.
132. Cf. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.57(l)(b)(10), .58(1)(a) (1989); see also K.M., 11 Fla. Admin. L.
Rep. 6026, 6031 (1989).
133. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the fourteenth amendment
protects freedom of personal choice in family matters. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753 (1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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The 1990 amendments introduced two slight but significant
changes. Two classifications are renamed: "confirmed" has been
changed to "proposed confirmed' '1 34 and "indicated" to "indicated-
perpetrator undetermined."' 13 In the case of "indicated-perpetrator
undetermined," the change is cosmetic, presumably to reduce the guilt
by implication of those named in the report.
The introduction of "proposed confirmed" is of greater signifi-
cance, for a second change modifies fundamentally the process of
classification. As with "confirmed" cases, those affected by the "pro-
posed confirmed" classification are given notice of the right to review
by the Department. The notice must also include a statement of the
facts relied upon in proposing the classification and the nature of the
alleged offense. 36 In addition to receiving this information, the al-
leged perpetrator may now request a review to determine the classifi-
cation, rather than to modify a classification already made. 137 The
effect may be slight, but the timing with respect to the abuse registry
is very different. The fact that a report has received preliminary classi-
fication as "proposed confirmed" is reported to the registry, 3 but
even after a determination that the "proposed confirmed" should be
"confirmed," until requested review is completed, the report is not
placed on the registry. 39
Even requests for review to the Department may take substantial
time. Although the right to administrative hearing ripens after thirty
days of departmental action, one would be reluctant to abandon the
opportunity for internal review even if it took more than thirty days
to complete. Such review does routinely take considerably longer than
thirty days. After departmental review, the process of an administra-
tive hearing can take many months. Under the amended statute, sub-
jects of "proposed confirmed" reports whose cases will eventually
end up classified as "unfounded" or "indicated-perpetrator undeter-
mined" will not be subject to job disqualification during the period of
time necessary to modify the proposed confirmed classification. 140
134. Ch. 90-50, § 5, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 74 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.503(10)).
135. Ch. 90-50, § 5, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 73-74 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 415.503(6), .503(16)).
136. Ch. 90-50, § 6, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 76 (West) (to be codified at FA. STAT. §
415.504(4)(d)(3)(a)).
137. Id.
138. Ch. 90-50, § 7, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 78 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.505(1)(f)).
139. Ch. 90-50, § 6, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 77 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.504(4)(d)(5)).
140. FLA. STAT. § 415.504(4)(d)(3) (1989).
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D. Child Protective Investigations
1. The teacher connection
Section 415.505 establishes procedures and objectives for the child
abuse investigation. In general, the section dictates that investigations
will begin promptly,' 4' that the investigation will make a determina-
tion of the risk to the child and possible services that may improve the
situation, and that the Department will inform the state attorney in
the case of deaths or may inform in the case of "proposed con-
firmed" reports. A separate section provides for immediate removal
of the child from the home in cases where prompt action is deemed
necessary. 42
Institutional abuse is singled out for separate treatment. 143 As be-
fore, the Department must immediately investigate institutional per-
sonnel, including school teachers, and notify the state attorney.'" The
state must conduct a criminal investigation, either jointly with the
child protective investigation or independent of it.' 41
This process has put a special burden on institutional personnel.
The Department may recommend criminal charges to the state attor-
ney, except in cases of death, aggravated abuse, or sexual battery,
where reporting is mandatory.'" As we have seen in reviewing judicial
decisions concerning "spanking," 147 teachers have been in the front
lines of those availing themselves of all rights provided by the system.
Moreover, the present action in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Florida challenging the constitutionality of
the abuse registry scheme,'" though in form a class action, is being
brought through teachers' unions. 149
Teachers do in fact face a special burden under the child abuse reg-
istry statute. Although a confirmed report does not statutorily dis-
qualify a person from teaching in a public school, many school
141. Investigation begins either immediately or within 24 hours depending on initial risk as-
sessment.
142. FLA. STAT. § 415.506.
143. FLA. STAT. § 415.505(2) (1989). The legislature made no changes to section 415.505(l)(i),
which mandates special procedures for interviewing at school alleged victims of non-institutional
(e.g., parental) abuse.
144. FLA. STAT. 415.505(2)(a) (1989).
145. Id.
146. Id. § 415.505(l)(h).
147. See supra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
148. N.L. v. Coler, 90-40069-MP (N.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 1990). See infra text accompanying
notes 157-161.
149. Id.
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districts are reluctant to retain teachers initially confirmed as perpetra-
tors and have suspended them during the pendency of review. The
change in classifications and accompanying procedures may relieve
teachers from being placed on involuntary leave during the review
process. These teachers would have formerly been classified as con-
firmed perpetrators, and thereby faced immediate suspension, essen-
tially on the judgment of the investigator alone. 150 Furthermore, the
amendments to section 415.505 suggest that the investigations them-
selves have been a source of controversy: new language mandates that
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the Depart-
ment of Education develop protocol for investigations in schools and
procedures for investigation and training of investigators.'51
2. New Right to Counsel During Questioning
The 1990 amendments to section 415.505 establish a remarkable
new procedural protection:
The alleged perpetrator shall be entitled to legal representation, at his
or her expense, during questioning in connection with the
investigation, but the absence of counsel shall not prevent the
department from proceeding with other aspects of the investigation
including interviews with other persons. Legal counsel shall be bound
by the confidentiality of § 415.51.152
The interjection of a right to counsel into the system represents a
considerable procedural safeguard against self-incrimination in a stat-
ute that clearly has criminal overtones. However, it is curious that the
procedural protections provided by the amendments to section
415.504153 do not expressly require that the investigator inform the al-
leged perpetrator of this right upon commencing the investigation. It
seems extremely unlikely that the legislature intended to require
"warning,' ' 54 but not to require notification of the right to counsel.
This new addition raises a number of questions, which ultimately
must be answered in the courts. Again, there is no fifth amendment
right to counsel with respect to civil investigations.'55 The investigator
150. See Ch. 90-50, § 7, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 78 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 415.505(l)(f)).
151. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 415.505(I)(b)(5)). The mandate is qualified, however,
by the legislative recognition that the departments must work "within existing resources." Id.
152. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 415.505(1)(a)).
153. Ch. 90-50, § 6, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 75 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.504(4)(c)(1)).
154. Id.
155. See supra note 131.
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has no power to make an individual reveal information, but if a per-
son cooperates to the point of making admissions which may later be
incriminating, there is no constitutional protection against the use of
those statements. 5 6 The legislature might, however, have created a
statutory "Miranda warning" in child protective investigations. If so,
the courts would ultimately determine whether statements made under
questioning without proper warning would be admissible in adminis-
trative hearings, and/or in dependency proceedings, and/or criminal
proceedings. If the investigator must notify the alleged perpetrator of
the right to counsel, the courts might also have to decide how long the
investigator must wait to question an alleged perpetrator after giving
notice. Unlike the true Miranda situation in which custody is in-
volved, the alleged perpetrator is free to go as he or she pleases. It
seems unlikely that a subject could avoid questioning entirely by re-
fusing to acquire counsel. On the other hand, the right is useless with-
out reasonable time to engage the services of an attorney.
The addition of the right to counsel at questioning is certainly the
most dramatic change made by the 1990 amendments. Although it will
take some time for the effects of the change to be felt, several ques-
tions await answers. First, how many people will actually choose to
exercise this rather expensive right? Second, if counsel is involved im-
mediately, will counsel remain involved throughout the investigation
and review process? Third, will the presence of counsel have an im-
pact on the frequency with which reports are initially classified pro-
posed confirmed? Only experience will provide the answers.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CmLD ABUSE REGISTRY LEGISLATION
The merest glance at the historical summary of any section of the
child abuse registry statute reveals that the Florida legislature has been
attentive to the needs of the statute. First enacted in 1963, the legisla-
tion has been amended regularly in the past two decades, and every
year since 1984 has seen some amendment to the statutory scheme.
Still, there remains significant problems in a system which allows ad-
ministrative intervention into family life in an effort to protect chil-
dren in settings where that very intervention might be threatening
harm.
A. Constitutional Perspectives
The plaintiffs in N.L. v. Coler 57 have attacked the child abuse reg-
istry statute directly on constitutional grounds. Named plaintiffs in
156. Id.
157. 90-40069-MP (N.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 1990)
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the class action are a "confirmed" perpetrator and persons whose
names are implicated in "indicated" reports. 5 8 The complaint is
based on the theory that sufficient interests are involved to require an
opportunity to be heard before classification is made and, in the case
of "indicated" reports, to require an opportunity to challenge the
classification.
Although N.L. v. Coler was filed before the procedural protections
provided by the 1990 amendments were in place, the new procedural
protections created by those amendments do not moot the issue of
how much process is due in an administrative setting. The United
States Supreme Court has held that the nature of the process required
to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment must be considered in relation
to the right being affected. 5 9 A "confirmed" child abuser faces the
deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest: the right to
work in certain occupations.160 Since anyone investigated as an alleged
perpetrator runs some risk of being classified as "confirmed," any
investigation might impinge upon a liberty interest.
6
'
If the statute does implicate a liberty interest, it must provide suffi-
cient procedural protections to satisfy federal due process concerns.
62
Under the amended law, the Department makes no classification of
"confirmed" until the alleged perpetrator has been given the opportu-
nity to request review by the Department. A person classified as "in-
dicated-perpetrator undetermined," however, enjoys no such right of
review. Because the statute forbids release of any names in an indi-
cated-perpetrator undetermined case, this classification affects no sub-
stantial rights and only the improper release of information could
adversely affect a person by creating the appearance of involvement
with child abuse. 63 One could argue that the absence of available pro-
cedures for challenging an "indicated-perpetrator undetermined" re-
port, combined with the prospect of potential disclosure renders the
statute unconstitutional.
If "indicated-perpetrator undetermined" reports do not impinge
upon significant rights, however, the statute need contain sufficient
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (must weigh importance of private
interest, protective value of procedure, and governmental interest).
160. This is certainly true for public employment. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-
52 (1973)(plurality opinion)(citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sin-
dermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)).
161. Cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (prior hearing required for driver's license sus-
pension where accident liability is at issue).
162. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332-33.
163. See Complaint, N.L. v. Coler, at 10-14 (alleging that disclosure and improper disclosure
have injured plaintiffs).
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procedures only with respect to "proposed confirmed" reports. After
the 1990 amendments, the statute provides that the report be given to
the alleged perpetrator and that "written comment 6r rebuttal" will
be made a part of the report. 164 The new legislation provides that a
"proposed confirmed" report confirmed after review will not appear
on the registry as a confirmed report until after resolution of any re-
quested administrative hearing. 165 There is no provision, however, for
the person to appear before the Department secretary or before com-
mittees appointed by the secretary to review the reports. Indeed, in
actual practice, those who supervise child protective investigators, and
who have reviewed recommendations with them, may sit on the com-
mittees assigned the task of providing requested review. In effect, the
Department is represented at this review while the alleged perpetrator
is not.
Defenders of the legislative scheme would argue that there can be
no impingement of rights until after the opportunity for a fact-finding
hearing. Again, the question would seem to revolve upon whether
damage has been done by forcing the individual to resort to the ex-
pense of an administrative hearing without any prior chance to be
heard before classification is made, as, for example, in the case of a
probable cause hearing.' 6
In addition to questions concerning procedural due process, one
might raise a colorable constitutional challenge to the legislation based
on the vague definition of harm. Although the First District has found
that the statute was not penal for the purposes of ex post facto prohi-
bitions, 167 the court noted that section 415.504 "may arguably have a
164. Ch. 90-50, § 6, 1990 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 64, 75 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.504(4)(c)(1)(g)).
165. FLA. STAT. § 405.515(l)(f) (1989).
166. On October 30, 1990, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Flor-
ida (Paul, J.) rendered an order on several motions in the N.L. case. Of significance to the
foregoing discussion is the court's granting in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. Specifically, Judge Paul found that with respect to "indicated" reports, section 415.504,
Florida Statutes, is facially unconstitutional in that fails to provide sufficient facial safeguards.
He also noted that the 1990 amendments have not cured the defect. With respect to "con-
firmed" reports, the court found that the statute contained sufficient procedures to satisfy the
demands of due process. Although the order does not use the term "proposed confirmed," and
is not explicit concerning the possible effect of the 1990 amendments, the order appears to be
addressing the statute both with and without those amendments. A complete analysis of the
effect of this order on the abuse registry system is premature at this time. Given the interlocutory
nature of the order, and the potential for a large damage award, the state will in all likelihood
appeal the order at some point. Furthermore, the court resolved only the procedural due process
issues raised in the complaint.
167. W.M. v. Department of HRS, 553 So. 2d 274 (Fla. Ist DCA 1990), rev. denied, 564 So.
2d 490 (Fla. 1990).
1991]
396 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 18:371
'penal effect." ' 6" If this "penal effect" were significant enough to
require due process, then a strong argument could be made that the
statute is unconstitutionally vague. The controversy over what consti-
tutes "harm" with respect to child discipline demonstrates the diffi-
culty of knowing in advance whether a spanking administered in a
customary manner will leave some sort of bruise and whether that
bruise may be sufficient temporary disfigurement to qualify as physi-
cal abuse and excessive corporal punishment. It is basic to the validity
of penal statutes that ordinary people using their customary experi-
ence must be able to distinguish between actions which are prohibited
and those which are not.' 9 Arbitrary enforcement cannot be encour-
aged. 170 "While the test for vagueness is more lenient for [a noncri-
minal] administrative rule than for a penal statue, the requirement
that a person of common intelligence be properly apprised of the con-
duct proscribed by the rule remains intact.' 17' In Bertens,72 for exam-
ple, the court found unconstitutionally vague a rule that led to the
suspension of a fifth-grader for giving two nonprescription vitamin
pills to friends in violation of a regulation requiring that "medicine"
be given to a staff member when brought to school.'7 The court held
that to include nonprescription vitamins as "medicine" rendered the
statute impermissibly vague. 74
If neither the statute nor the courts prohibit corporal punishment,
but a person must guess at whether any resulting minor bruises will
render the corporal punishment excessive, then the statute is suscepti-
ble to being held unconstitutionally vague.
B. Problems of Administering the Child Abuse Registry Statute
The 1990 amendments have made significant procedural advances
which will aid administration of the abuse registry statute. Still, ad-
ministration of the statute continues to face significant practical prob-
lems, such as its potential use to harass and embarrass. Even when
reports are made in good faith, however, there is often a tension be-
tween the value systems of the individuals involved in the investigation
and the views of those investigated.
168. Id. at 278.
169. Bertens v. Stewart, 453 So. 2d 92, 93-94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
170. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357 (1983); see also State v. Bussey, 463 So. 2d
1141, 1144 (Fla. 1985); Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources,
453 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 1984).
171. Bertens, 453 So. 2d at 94.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 95.
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The grizzly story of Bradley McGee recounted at the beginning of
this study involved a departmental employee who was found to have
been negligent with respect to investigation and reporting. Such threat
of prosecution is sure to influence child protective investigators to err
on the side of more stringent classification. While there may be no
civil liability for mistakes,'17 the fate of the social worker in the
McGee case must be chilling to all who work in the field. Moreover,
investigators are not police officers trained to do criminal investiga-
tion, but they do, unlike police officers, make a decision based on
their own investigations. Thus, the nature of the tasks undertaken by
these investigators may lead to significant problems in administering a
difficult statute.
Consequently, the child abuse registry statute has settled on a very
uneasy compromise between individual and family rights and child
protection. A review of administrative decisions in this area reveals
just how varied are the conclusions of investigators and the reactions
of the Department to recommended orders. One case supplies an espe-
cially good view of the tension at the boundaries of this process.
In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. B.D.M.,1 76
the hearing officer found that B.D.M. had left her two-year-old
daughter alone in her infant car seat around five o'clock in the after-
noon in a parking area about fifty yards from the after school day
care center where the mother's other daughter was waiting. 77 The
mother left the motor running to keep the car warm on a cold day. 78
At that time of day, it normally took two to seven minutes for the
mother to walk to the center and return with the other daughter. 79
The incident was reported, investigated, and classified "confirmed."
Based on the evidence, the hearing officer recommended that the re-
port be expunged.'80
Although the Department secretary generally accepted the hearing
officer's recommendations, he rejected "any implication that a single
act or omission" could never constitute abuse, 8' and, based on the
fact that hearing officer wrote of the incident that "[a]t most, [the
175. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Com-
ment, Abused Children and State-Created Protection Agencies: A Proposed Section 1983 Stan-
dard, 57 U. CN. L. REv. 1419 (1988).
176. 12 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 2170 (1990).
177. Id. at 2173.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2174.
181. Id. at 2171.
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mother] exercised poor judgment,"'18 2 reclassified the report as "indi-
cated.'"" 3
This case shows the frustration inherent in the system. If B.D.M.'s
actions constituted statutory neglect, what classification is left for
malnutrition, or, for example, continually leaving toddlers while go-
ing out to drink? Furthermore, because the statutory relief outside the
Department is under Chapter 120, the Department remains able to
change the result after the citizen has received what appears to be his
or her "day in court." The only completely independent forum is ap-
pellate review.
C. Suggestions for Reform
Two reforms might address the basic problem above. One would be
to give the Division of Administrative Hearings final order authority
for hearings requested pursuant to section 415.504. In this way the
citizen would not be subjected to double scrutiny by the Department.
Because of the nature of administrative hearings, only findings of fact
in the hearing officer's recommended order are binding on the De-
partment. 8 4 The administrative hearing is perceived as a "day in
court"; however, as such it can be deceptive, because the Department
has the final authority. An independent review at the fact-finding
stage would better preserve the citizen's day in court. The hearing of-
ficer would still give due deference to departmental interpretations of
the statute, and the Department would remain free to appeal cases it
felt were wrongly decided.
A second reform was suggested in a bill'85 by Senators Eleanor
Weinstock 8 6 and George Stuart 8 7 and included the following provi-
sion: "A person who challenges a classification of a proposed con-
firmed report by requesting an administrative hearing and who
prevails in such challenge shall be awarded costs of litigation including
reasonable attorney's fees and expert witness fees." Such a fees provi-
sion would do much to remove the heavy burden placed on those ac-
cused of child abuse.
As the system stands, there is little incentive for abuse investigators
to ponder close calls. In fact, as the case of B.D.M.'8 8 illustrates, it is
182. Id. at 2173.
183. Id. at 2171.
184. A hearing officer's findings of fact must be supported by competent, substantial evi-
dence in order to be binding on an agency. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)(10) (1989).
185. The bill, SB 790 (1990), would have amended FLA. STAT. § 415.504(4)(d)(5).
186. Dem., West Palm Beach.
187. Dem., Orlando.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 176-83.
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very easy to make a "proposed confirmed" classification based an
abundance of caution or solipsistic notions of proper child care. The
statute screens the investigator from all liability as long as action is
taken in good faith.8 9 Moreover, testing the Department's classifica-
tion in an administrative hearing is expensive. It is a reasonable as-
sumption that many persons, disturbed though they may be, simply
do not pursue their cases.190
A fees provision would allow many more persons realistic access to
the process afforded to test "proposed confirmed" classifications,
and increased litigation would have the effect of clarifying the edges
of the child abuse definition. The threat of attorney and expert fees in
cases where unsupportable "proposed confirmed" classifications were
put forth would be a very definite incentive for the Department to
monitor its investigators and their supervisors carefully to ensure that
the definitions were understood and implemented consistently and
uniformly. Under this model, any ambiguities in this "near penal"
statute could be worked out in a context much like that of the crimi-
nal system where attorneys are regularly provided for indigents and
where penalties are sufficiently severe to force even those of modest
means to employ counsel.
Provision for public reimbursement of attorney's fees could, of
course, prove to be expensive. Such compensation could further strain
the already tight departmental budget by requiring the agency to hire
more attorneys, possibly at the expense of more child protective inves-
tigators. The Department may well find itself reacting with overly cau-
tious classifications. In the present state of affairs, however, these
may be liabilities which the public should accept in order to make the
statute less susceptible to uneven administration.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1990 legislature has made quite significant changes in the child
abuse registry statute. Procedures which require that those reported as
abusers be given detailed notice concerning the investigation process
and the opportunity to obtain counsel before questioning should help
to lessen the chance of overzealousness or unfair treatment. Allowing
the resolution of challenges to a proposed classification before placing
names on the registry avoids the injustice of having an innocent indi-
189. FLA. STAT. § 415.511 (1989).
190. The plaintiffs in N.L. allege that there are approximately 50,000 confirmed cases and
400,000 indicated cases on the abuse registry. See Complaint, N.L. v. Coler, 90-40069-MP at 3
(N.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 1989).
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vidual incorrectly listed as an abuser for a considerable period of
time.
This study has presented for consideration two further reforms. It
suggests that the Division of Administrative Hearings be given final
order authority over those cases where an individual requests adminis-
trative review of a proposed confirmed classification. In the case of a
statute with penal overtones, fairness requires review independent of
the agency which makes the initial decision at a point in the process
before judicial review. Second, the study proposes that those who suc-
cessfully challenge the Department's proposed confirmed classifica-
tions be awarded attorney's fees. In this way, the individual will be
less discouraged to pursue the remedies afforded out of a concern for
expense. The increased scrutiny will also help to clarify the parameters
of this important and controversial statute.
